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ABSTRACT
General equilibrium models have recently been used to simulate the
effects of many proposed tax changes. However, in modelling the effects
of the government on the economy, these models have assumed for simplicity
that marginal tax rates equal the observed average tax rates, and that
marginal benefit rates are zero.
The main purpose of this paper is to derive improved estimates of
various marginal tax and benefit rates. Most importantly, we include in
the model recent theories concerning the effects of combined corporate
and personal taxes on corporate financial and investment decisions. The
conclusions previously derived concerning the effects of corporate tax
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General equilibrium models of the U.S.economy have grown much more realistic in
the last few years, becoming more disaggregated andusing more recent and extensive data on
differences in behavior among individual consumers andproducers. Serious attempts have
been made using these models to simulate the effects ofseveral proposed tax changes, includ-
ing integration of the corporate with the personal income tax andreplacement of the income
tax with a consumption tax. However, in attempting tocapture the effects of the government
on the economy, these models have generally assumed forsimplicity that marginal tax rates
equal the observed average tax rates and that marginal benefit ratesare zero.
The main purpose of this paper is to derive improved estimatesof various marginal
tax rates and to take into account certain offsetting marginal benefits.We use the general
equilibrium tax model of Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (1978,1980), hereafter denoted by
FSW, as a starting point for this remodelling effort. Mostimportantly, we include in the model
recent theories developed in Gordon (1980) concerning the effects ofcombined corporate and
personal taxes on firms' financial and capital intensity decisions. We alsoapply the same
theoretical approach to the modelling of governmental financialand capital intensity decisions.
This approach takes explicit account of uncertainty, theflexibility of corporate financial policy,
and inflation. In addition, we briefly reexamine themodelling of the property tax, unemploy-
ment insurance, workmen's compensation, and social security.
To test the importance of the above changes in themodelling of government--2-
induced distortions, we resimulate the effects of integration of corporate with personal income
taes. We find, contrary to FSW, that the welfare gains of lessening taxdistortions through
integration are more than offset by the welfare losses resulting from raising tax rates onlabor
income in order to replace lost revenue. This result is particularly strong becauseFSW
included only intertemporal and interindustry allocation welfare gains, whereas we allow further
welfare gains from eliminating the tax distortion which favors debt finance.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section I, we reexamine some of the
marginal distortions created by the various taxes on labor. In Section II, wedescribe our
nodeIling of the effects of corporate and personal taxes on firms' financial and investmentdeci-
sions. We also describe here the construction of the data needed to calculate the new industry
specific marginal costs of capital. Section III describes a few other adjustmentsin the model
made necessary by the change in the modelling of taxes on capital income. Finally, SectionIV
describes the simulation procedure and the results from our resimulation of corporate tax
integration using our revised general equilibrium model.
I. Changes in the Modelling of Tax Distortions on Labor Income
While FSW carefully measure the size of the various taxes that apply to labor
income, they ignore the fact that higher tax payments are often associated with largertransfer
receipts. In particular, benefits are closely associated with tax payments in theSocial Security
program, in unemployment insurance, and in workmen's compensation.The taxes from these
programs are distorting only to the degree that marginal taxesdiffer from marginal benefits.
We discuss each of these programs in turn.
We do not attempt to take into account in this paper other transfer programs, such
as food stamps, public housing, and AFDC, where benefits also create an implicit tax onlabor
income. We model these transfers as though they are paid in a lump sum fashion, as did FSW.
As a result, we may underestimate the welfare costs of increases in tax rates on laborincome.1-3-
A. Social Security
The effect of current labor supply on future Social Security benefits is very compli-
cated, as described in Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980). The present value of marginal
benefits arising from further work will exceed marginal taxes for older men (at least as old as
65)butwill probably fall short of marginal taxes for the very elderly, for younger workers, and
for most women. However, we have insufficient information to capture this diversity of net
distortions. We would need to know the age, and sex composition of workers in each industry
as well as individuals in each consumer group. Instead, in the simulations below, we assume
that the average net distortion from Social Security is zero, on the assumption that those facing
a net subsidy come close to counterbalancing those who face a net tax. Since we therefore omit
from the model the diverse distortions on individual labor supply created by Social Security, we
may further underestimate the welfare costs of tax increases on labor income.
B. Unemployment Insurance
Most state unemployment insurance programs use a reserve ratio formula to set the
firm's tax rate. This formula tries to ensure that the tax payments made by the firm would just
match the benefits received by its former workers. When this happens, workers anticipate
future benefits equal in value to the taxes they currently pay, so the program should not distort
labor supply decisions. For a discussion of the law and some remaining distortions, see Brown
(1980).
However, state unemployment insurance programs also set a maximum and
minimum tax rate on each firm. When a firm is at such a constraint, its workers should antici-
pate receiving either more or less in benefits, on average, than they currently pay in taxes,
implying a net tax or subsidy. The degree to which this happens does differ systematically by
industry. Becker (1972) examined the net transfers among industries in several states during
the 1950's and 1960's and calculated a net tax or subsidy rate for many industries.2 The appen-
dix describes how we obtain labor tax rates for our industry classification from Becker's
classification. Table I, column 1, reports the resulting net unemployment insurance tax rates-4-
by industry.
C. Workmen's Compensation
The final change we made was to assume that workmen's compensation programs
are nondistorting. While such programs are normally mandated by the government,the cost of
the program to each firm is typically negotiated with a private insurance company. Competition
among insurance companies implies that expected taxes and benefits ought tobe equal for each
firm. There are a few public programs, but these correspond closely in form to the private pro-
grams, and should therefore be nearly nondistorting as well.
II. TaxDistortionsAffecting Firms' Financial and Investment Decisions
In the FSW model, corporate financial policy is exogenous, while capital intensity
decisions are distorted by a marginal tax rate set equal to the observed average tax rate on capi-
tal income, calculated separately by industry. The average tax rate in each industry is set equal
to the ratio of corporate, personal, and property tax payments in 1973 to capital incomein that
year. Capital is then allocated such that the rate of return to capital netof taxes and deprecia-
tion is equated in all industries.
This approach conveniently abstracts from the many detailed provisions of the U. S.
tax law. However, it has many problems. Most immediately, the measured average tax rate
depends critically on the measure for true earnings to capital. This latter numberis difficult to
calculate appropriately in any year, and varies greatly from year to year. This variation implies
that there is substantial measurement error in the calculated tax rates. In this paper, we instead
model the tax law directly and calculate the cost of capital implied by the prevailing market
interest rate and the existing tax law. While this procedure requires much new data in order to
characterize the tax law by industry, it does not require capital income and tax payment figures,
which can fluctuate sharply from year to year.
A more important reason for our remodelling, however, is that the explicit model of
the effect of taxes on capital intensity decisions implies that marginal tax distortions differ-5-
dramatically from average tax rates, even if all figures can be measured without error. In this
model, the government shares in the risk in the return to capital since its tax revenue is sto-
chastic. The benefits to the firm of transferring to the government some of the risk in the
return to its capital is not taken into account when calculating an average tax rate. This
offsetting benefit turns out to be very important.
In addition to explicitly modelling a firm's capital intensity decisions, we model
simultaneously how taxes affect the firm's optimal financial policy.3 We assume that firms
cho.9se a debt-equity ratio which minimizes their cost of capital, trading off the tax advantages
of debt against bankruptcy or other leverage related costs. These leverage related costs are real
costs which profit maximizing firms will choose to bear in order to save taxes, and are part of
the distortion costs created by the existing taxes on capital income.
In our model of both financial and capital intensity decisions, we explicitly model
both uncertainty and inflation. The basic model, a generalization of the capital asset pricing
model, is developed in Gordon-Bradford (l980). It is further analyzed in Gordon-Malkiel
(1980) and in Gordon (1980). In the next two sections, we briefly describe how in this model
corporate financial and capital intensity decisions depend on the tax law.
A. Modelling ofCorporateFinancial Decisions
The tax law treats differently the returns to bonds and equity. First, only payments
to bond holders are deductible from the corporate tax base. Counterbalancing this, however,
the personal income tax is generally higher on income from bonds, since much of the income
from equity is in the form of capital gains, which are taxed more lightly. Let (1—a) represent
the effective personal tax rate on nominal income earned from stocks, (l—ab) the effectiveper-
sonal tax rate on interest income from bonds, r the corporate tax rate, and r the nominal
interest rate paid on bonds. Then if the firm were to issue another dollar of debt and use the
proceeds to repurchase a dollar of equity (holding the capital stock unchanged), the change in
after tax income to investors would be abr—ar(l—r). The new bond holder receivesabr after
tax while the remaining equity holders lose only ar(l—r) after both corporate and personal-6-
income taxes (when they pay the interest on the extra debt). Gordon-Malkiel (1980) showthat
for plausible values of aandas,, the expression r(ab—a(l—1)) is positive,which implies that
investors as a group can save on taxes by any and all increases in the firm's debt-capitalratio.
While replacing equity with debt is advantageous for tax reasons, a higher debt-
capital ratio also implies a higher probability of default. Bankruptcyand the threat of ban-
kruptcy create real costs.5 The firm's debt-capital ratio is in equilibriumwhen the increase in
expected leverage related costs resulting from replacing a dollar of equitywith a dollar of debt
just offsets the tax savings from using a dollar of debt insteadof equity. Let y represent the
firm's debt-capital ratio, and let c('y)representthe increase in expected leverage related costs
borne by investors as a group from having an extra dollar of debt when the initial debt-capital
ratio is y.6Thenin equilibriumis chosen such that: r(ab—a(l—r)) =c(y).One would
expect that c(0)0 and —>0. If there were no tax distortion favoring debt, this formula
implies that the firm would use only equity finance and thus avoid all bankruptcyrisk.
Leverage related costs include more than just direct litigation costsin bankruptcy.
As Warner (1977) and Gordon-Malkiel (1980) show, litigation costs themselves are verysmall.
When the firm faces the possibility of bankruptcy, however, it also faces distorted investment
incentives, as described in Myers (1977). When considering a risky investment, equityholders
ignore the higher probability of losses to existing debt holders. Since equityholders receive any
gains, but pass large enough loses onto bond holders, they facedistorted investment decisions.
Though debt holders would presumably charge for these costs ex-ante,distorted investment
incentives would remain and equity holders would bear the costs of this inefficiency.In addi-
tion, labor costs can rise, since employees would be reluctant to remain in a jobwith an uncer-
tain future. The function c(y) is intended to capture all such leverage related costs.
Letrepresent the amount of debt chosen to finance the capital stock K,and let
=D/K.Then, since c (y) measures the marginal leverage costs of using a dollar more
debt, 5c(D/K)dDmeasures the total leverage cost borne by the firm's investors. If we-7-
assume that c(_y)hasthe functional form c(y) =a_ye, thenin equilibrium the total costs from
having D* of debt would be
a_yD* —rD*(ab_a(l_r))
(1) e+l e+l
This expression provides a measure of the privately borne costs resulting from the tax distor-
tion favoring debt finance.7
However, any extra expenses arising from a higher debt-capital ratio, e.g. resources
spent negotiating and monitoring an agreement, would be deductible from the corporate tax
base. These net of corporate tax costs would then also reduce the individual's personal tax
base. Therefore, the expression for private leverage costs c(-y)representsonly a(l—r) percent
of the total (social) extra leverage related costs resulting from replacing a dollar of equity with a





In the simulations of proposed tax changes, we will calculate the change in this esti-
mate of leverage related costs. This change represents an efficiency gain (or loss) resulting
from changing the tax distortion which presently favors debt finance.
B. Modelling of Capital Intensity Decisions
Corporate capital intensity decisions will depend on the cost of finance when the
firm is using this optimal debt-capital ratio. We assume that the capital stock of a corporation is
in equilibrium when investors are willing to pay just a dollar for the returns from an additional
dollar of capital. Consider a type of investment where the returns are nonstochastic. Then the
investment would be pursued using debt finance (with the capital as security), since there
would be no leverage related costs offsetting the tax advantage of debt. When the return to an
investment is risky, however, the optimal percent of debt, used in financing it will be lower
because the firm will trade off the tax advantages of debt against the costs arising from the
higher risk of default. If the return from new investment is just as risky as the return from-8-
existingcapital, we would expect that the appropriate y''forthe new capital would equal the
existing yforthe firm as a whole. We will assume that these conditions hold, so that the mar-
ginal yequalsthe average y.
Tobe willing to finance a project, equity and debt holders must receive at least the
risk free return after tax, plus enough to compensate them for the risk that they bear. Define
as the total after tax risk premium required by corporate equity and debt holders together on
the return from each dollar they invest in the project. By definition, t5includesany leverage
related costs. Also, let rbethe before tax risk free interest rate, and let Pcbethe project's
expected rate of return gross of both tax and depreciation. Then, in equilibrium, the marginal
investment ought to earn a psuchthat
a(1—r)(p—yr)+ abyr = abrZ+t5C. (2)
The first term on the left hand side measures the return to equity holders after tax, and the
second term measures the after tax return to debt holders. This implies that
ab ab—a(lr) ________ )—yr( )+ . (3)
a(l—r) a(1—r) a(l—r)
Theright hand side of this equation in effect measures the before tax rate of return to the
investment required by the market. Note that, at the optimal debt-capital ratio, this expression
is minimized.8
This derivation ignores many complications, however. Suppose that, for each indus-
try, d is the geometric rate of economic depreciation of capital, and d is the constant
geometric rate of depreciation for tax purposes that implies the same discounted present value
of tax deductions as the more complicated tax law. Suppose that k is the effective rate of the
investment tax credit, and 1,,isthe effective rate of state and local property tax (net of benefits)
on the capital stock. Suppose also that ir is the expected inflation rate. When all these addi-
tional factors are introduced, the equilibrium value of Pcwillsatisfy:9-9-
ab o(1—k) pd+t+(l—k)r( )+
a(1—T) a(1—r)
aba(1r) r(d—dX)______ —yr + — . (4)
a(1—r) (1—r) (l—r)
Here,Pcisa real rate of return, while r and r are nominal risky and risk-free interest rates,
respectively.
This formula is basically a generalization of the well known formula for the cost of
capital in Hall-Jorgenson (1967). If uncertainty is ignored (so ö,'=O and r=r), if personal and
property taxes are ignored (so aab—l and :=O), if inflation is ignored (so r=O), and finally,
if the possibility of debt finance is ignored (so yO), the above formula simplifies to
d+r(1—k)—rd
Pc . (5) l—r
This formula now differs from that in Hall-Jorgenson only because the decision under con-
sideration here is to invest a dollar now and then maintain a dollar of capital in place through
later investments to offset depreciation. Hall-Jorgenson, in contrast, consider only whether to
invest a dollar now.10 Each of the generalizations included here changes the degree to which
taxes affect the equilibrium marginal product of capital. In some cases they change it greatly.
Now consider the capital stock of a non-corporate firm in the same setting. It will
+l .1 t...., ,l+, +n.a,\ +1 1# nil ...juzzi EJLI.4nhnV.nl.1l Lu,., l,,JjjJ,nnan I s#l.an An aLL..,n LLS,I ....naknLJnl aink. kan..,oJkjtaala LIIA LS#I La/k
returnon a risk-free asset plus enough to compensate for the risk. Defineas the after tax
risk premium required by non-corporate proprietors in each industry on the return from each
dollar they invest, and define m as the proprietor's personal marginal tax rate. Then,will
satisfy
(1—k)(p,+1r—t— d)—-j-- (p,—d—t)= r(1—m)+ ô (6)
Solving for p,, we find
p,.nd+tp+(lk)r+(±;;k) + lm (d—d)— l-m
(7)-10-
In these equations, we have assumed that the proprietor finances the capital himself.If he
obtains extra funds from another party with the same marginal tax rate, then the equation con-
tinues to hold, whether the proprietor borrows from the other individual or makeshim a
partner in the business. Since there is no tax advantage todebt finance here, debt will only be
used when it creates no leverage related costs. Also, since the proprietor's personal assets, as
well as the business's assets, can be put up as collateral, debt can be kept riskless, and presum-
ably free of leverage costs, much more easily here than in the corporate sector.
We modified equation (6) slightly for the real estate industry, which includes both
rental and owner occupied housing. For owner occupied housing, there is basically no personal
income tax on the returns to the investment, though tcontinuesto be deductible, implying
that in equilibrium
(1—k)(p+ dt,,(1m)) =r(1—in)+ ô,, . (8)
The above analysis of non-corporate investment is also not quite appropriate for ren-
tal housing. We ignore any taxation of inflationary capital gains in other noncorporatebusiness
on the presumption that the gains would be realized sufficiently rarely, exceptat death when
they would be tax free. In rental housing, however, gains are realizedmuch more frequently.





To obtain p,.,, for the real estate industry as a whole, we took a weighted average ofthe equili-
brium values for rental and owner occupied housing. For weights, we used the sizesof the cap-
ital stock in each sector.11
In order to apply the above theory to the FSW general equilibrium model, several
further assumptions must be made. Each industry will be characterized by its own values for d,
d, k, and ,therisk premium when there are no leverage costs. In effect, the inherent
riskiness and durability of capital assets used by each industry will be taken to be exogenous.
The corporate sector in each industry will also be characterized by its observed values for 'y and—11—
ô. However, corporate financial policy (-y)willbe endogenous in the model, as will be the size
of the leverage cost component of ö. A later section derives expressions for the inherent risk
component of ô, which will remain constant, and the leverage cost component of .5, which
varies with 'y. When tax changes are simulated, these parameters and ö, will vary systemati-
cally from their observed values.
The values for these industry specific parameters, together with the market parame-
ters r,r, r,r,a,and abdeterminea value of p,foreach industry. The same industry and
market parameters are used along with a proprietor's tax rate mtodetermine a value of pin
each industry. We then take a weighted average of PCandP,.usingas weights the relative
sizes of the corporate and non-corporate capital stocks in that industry. The percent of capital
in each industry used by incorporated firms is assumed to be exogenous)2 The resulting indus-
try wide value for the marginal product of capital we denote by p.
Giventhe market interest rates randr2,wehave a separate value of p for each
industry. Given the rest of the model, these values for pimplya desired capital stock for each
industry. The sum over all industries of these desired capital stocks equals the total demand for
capital. In each equilibrium simulation, the solution algorithm finds an rsuchthat this total
demand for capital just equals the available supply of capital.'3 The supply of capital in each
period is fixed, but the endogenous savings response of one period is used to appropriately aug-
ment the capital stock for the next equilibrium in the sequence. This process is described in
more detail below.
C.Derivationof Data Required to Calculate p
Inorder to use the above procedure to calculate the equilibrium marginal product in
each industry, much new data are needed. In this section, we describe how we calculate each
of the needed variables. We calculate data values for 1973 in order to be comparable with the
FSW model.-12-
1. Property Tax Rates (tn)
InFSW, the property tax is modelled as a distorting proportional income tax on cap-
ital. The benchmark tax rate on any industry is set equal to the observed property tax pay-
ments relative to net capital income in that industry. Since owner-occupied housing isincluded
in the housing industry, this modelling applies to household as well as commercial and indus-
trial payers of property taxes.
In the above derivation, the property tax was modelled instead as a proportional tax
on the value of the capital stock. However, the appropriate value of t,isnot clear. The aver-
age tax rate can readily be calculated by taking the ratioof property tax payments to the value
of the capital stock in each industry. However, local public expenditures financed by the pro-
perty tax provide some offsetting benefits. Tiebout (1956),McGuire (1974), and Hamilton
(1976) take both benefits and taxes into account, and develop a set of assumptions underwhich
the property tax on residential property is nondistorting. It is just a price at which households
can purchase local public goods. The assumptions underlying this conclusion are strong.For
example, they rule out any spillover of benefits across community lines. They also require a
large number of communities, yet the population of each community must be sufficiently large
that further expansion entails congestion costs which just offset the gains from sharing the costs
of public expenditures with more people. In this paper, however, we wili accept the Tiebout
hypothesis for households as a first approximation. Specifically, we assume thatthe effective
property tax rate in the housing industry is zero.'4 However, we do report brieflybelow on a
simulation where half of property taxes on housing are treated as distorting.
Application of the Tiebout hypothesis to commercial and industrial property seems
less convincing. A defense of this application is developed in Fischel (1975) and White (1975).
The essence of the argument is that if communities compete to obtain commercial and indus-
trial property, then the property tax payments and the benefits will, in equilibrium, be set such
that the community is indifferent to whether or not a new firm enters. As a result, a profit
maximizing firm will choose the most efficient location. Its tax payments may go not only to-13-
finance the benefits it receives but also to compensate the community for thenoise, pollution,
or congestion that it creates. In this setting it seems plausible to assume that the tax is nondis-
torting.
However, once a firm has located and is considering additional investment, it has
lost its bargaining position with the community. To relocate, the firm would incurlarge fixed
Costs. The community may have some inhibition about exploiting captive firms. Some firms
may indeed leave and certainly new firms would as a result be more reluctant to enter. Yet in
this context there is certainly less competitive pressure toequate additional taxes with addi-
tional benefits.
Because of the ambiguity of the theory, we ran two sets of simulations. Inone
simulation, all property tax payments were exactly offset by benefits. In the other simulation,
half of nonresidential tax payments were assumed to be offset by benefits, while all ofresiden-
tial tax payments continued to be offset by benefits. Together the two simulationsprovide a
sensitivity test of the importance of the treatment of the property tax. The effective tax rates
used in the second case are reported in column 2 of Table 1. Theseparameters equal half of
the observed property tax divided by the capital stock in that industry.
2.CorporateDebt-CapitalRatios (rny)
Gordon-Malkjel(1980) used data from the COMPUSTAT'5 tape to estimate the
ratio of the market value of debt to the market value of debt plus equity. This calculation
included firms with securities traded on the New York Stock Exchange, on the American Stock
Exchange, and over the counter. Only economy wide figures were reported in thatpaper.
Here, we used the same procedure to calculate the ratio separately for each ofour eighteen
private industries.'6 The resulting figures for 1973 are reported in column 3 of Table l.'
3. RiskPremiums,(oandö,,)
Consider a particular security s, with an expected after tax return ,,wherethe bar
indicates expectations. The capital asset pricing model implies that the riskpremium —a,r
ought to equal (i —a,ri), where F,, is the expected after tax return on the market-14-
portfolio, andis the covariance of r and rm,dividedby the variance of Tm.Therisk prem-
ium can be measured either directly, by using i —a, r, orit can be measured indirectly by
estimatingfor that security and multiplying by the expected risk premium on the market
portfolio.
Here, in estimating &,wehave chosen the indirect method to measure the risk
premium on equity in each industry, and the direct method to measure the risk premium on
bonds. The risk premium &, appropriate for a dollar invested in corporate capital in each indus-
try is then the sum of the risk premium ondollars of debt and the risk premium on (1—7)
dollars of equity.
To calculate each industry's risk premium on equity, we proceeded by first estimat-
ing the fi for a value weighted portfolio of the equity from all firms in the industry which were
traded publicly on the New York Stock Exchange. The estimation was done over the period
1969-1973 using the Center for Research in Securities Prices monthly returns data. The market
portfolio was taken to be a value weighted portfolio of the equity from all firms traded on the
New York Stock Exchange. The risk premium on the equity in each industry is then this esti-
mate of fi times the expected excess return on the market portfolio, which Merton (1980) esti-
mates to be .1075 18
Lacking information about how the risk premium on bonds varied by industry, we
assumed a common risk premium of ab(r—r2),whichequals .0246 using the parameter values
discussed below. The value of ô, was then set equal to .1075(l—y)/3-+.02467 in each industry.
Implicitly we assume here that the potential new capital in an industry is equally as risky as the
existing capital. The resulting values for &, by industry are reported in column 4 of Table 1.
The value of ô,.,. ought to differ from that for &.fortwo major reasons. First, given
present tax law, investment will be riskier in the corporate sector where tax incentives favor
debt. For non-corporate investment, no taxes are saved through debt rather than "equity"
finance, so there is no tax incentive to accept real leverage related costs.'9 Therefore, the risk
premium on a non-corporate investment ought to be smaller than that on an otherwise-15-
equivalent corporate investment since it ought to be free of leverage related costs.
To estimate the additional leverage cost arising from investment in one more dollar
of corporate capital, assume that leverage costs are proportional to the size of the capital stock
for any firm, holding -y constant. The marginal leverage costs would then equal the expression
for privately borne leverage costs derived earlier, divided by the size of the capital stock, or
e+l
.Withoutthe tax distortion favoring debt, the corporate risk premium would
be smaller by this amount.
A second reason forto differ from 5 is that the government absorbs a different
percent of the risk from investment in each sector. The risk borne by investors on a dollar
investment would differ between the sectors, even if the inherent20 riskiness of the investment
were the same, because the tax rates differ. Because of taxes, the risk borne by corporate
investors is only a(1—r) percent of the total risk in the return to corporate capital. Similarly,
non-corporate investors bear only (1—rn) percent of the total risk in the return on their capital.
We assume that these are the only two reasons why ô,,, differs from &.Inparticu-
lar, we assume that non-corporate capital is just as risky as corporate capital, leverage costs
aside, and that non-corporate investors charge the same risk premium per unit risk that they




In the simulations, we will assign to the investment in each industry a constant
o
inherentrisk premium, 5, equal to l-m (This measure corrects for the fact that only (1—rn)
percent of non-corporate risk is borne privately and does not include any leverage costs.) The
risk premium appropriate for privately borne risk in the non-corporate sector will then be sim-
ply (1—rn). Only if the proprietor's tax rate changes in a simulation would the non-corporate
risk premium change. Similarly, the corporate risk premium for privately borne risk will be set
equal to:-16-
-yr(ab—a(l—T)) C a(lr)5+ b+1 (11)
Thus, if the tax incentive favoring debt is reduced, the leverage cost component of 5 will
decline.
4. Investment Tax Credit Rates (k)
After an April 1969 repeal, the investment tax credit (ITC) was reintroduced in
1971. It allowed any corporate or non-corporate business to subtract from its tax bill 7% (4%
for public utilities) of its eligible investment expenditures, defined as equipment with at least a
seven year useful life. One-third credit was allowed for assets with 3 to 5 year lives and two-
thirds credit for 5 to 7 year lives. The 7% statutory rate was increased to 10% in 1975 and sub-
sequently made permanent. The parameter k in above formulae, however, refers to an
effective ITC rate on all investment (including inventories and plant as well as equipment). It
ought to take into account all limitations, carry-forward, and carry-back provisions. Because the
proportion of investments which are eligible for the credit, or for different fractions of the
credit, will vary by industry, the effective ITC rate, k, will also vary by industry.
In order to estimate this effective ITC rate in each industry, we looked at the dollar
value of credit taken in a particular year relative to that year's total investment. Because the
credit taken in 1973 may not reflect the credit which eventually accrued to 1973 investments,
we took the average of the effective rates in 1973 and 1974.22 We thus tried to obtain a "steady
state" rate which accounts for carry-forwards and carry-backs. The appendix provides details
concerning how the data were obtained. The resulting figures for the effective ITC rates appear
for each industry in Table I, column 5.
5. Economic Depreciation Rates (d)
The above formulae require eighteen annualized rates of depreciation for the indus-
tries defined in this model. Several other studies23 have estimated rates of depreciation using
various assumptions and various investment disaggregates, but none is immediately applicable
for our purposes. Some studies, however, provide dollar values of economic depreciation for-17-
industry definitions similar to ours. Using time-series on investment by industry, we can esti-
mate geometric annual rates of depreciation for use in this model.
Looking at a particular industry, suppose that ED, is the dollar figure for economic
depreciation in the ith year during the period 1972 to 1974. The sources for data on ED are
described in the appendix. We then tried to find that geometric depreciation rate on all prior
investments in that industry which would be most consistent with the observed values ED1.
Let j,R represent gross real investment undertaken in year t, in year i dollars. Then if there
were geometric depreciation at rate d, economic depreciation in year i would equal:
ED1 = d (1 —d )tJ,.
Here, ED, represents the predicted value, in contrast to the actual value of ED1.
One problem, of course, is that investment data by industry were not available prior
to 1947. The small effect of pre-1947 investment can be approximated by assuming that invest-
ment in all years before 1947 grew at the same rate, .Weestimatedto be .027 for all non-
residential investment and .021 for residential investment from aggregate data available over
the period 1929 to 1947. If these two categories of real investments did grow at these rates
before 1947, and if the same depreciation rate applied in all years before 1947, then the depre-
ciation on pre-1947 investments in 1972 would be
AIR—26d a
df11947 e'edi = (12)
26
where26 is the number of years between 1946 and 1972. In general, then, we approximated
ED1 by
- dIR —d(i—1947+1) 1—1947
ED1 = +d + dIfL1 (1 —d)' . (13)
t=O
Wethen chose that value of d for each industry which minimized the sum of
squared differences between the observed ED, and our predicted ED1 during the period 1972-
1974. The appendix provides information about the sources of the data and further details-18-
about the procedure. The eighteen resulting economic depreciation rates, d, are reported in
Table 1, column 6.
6. Tax Depreciation Rates (di)
Above formulae used d as the effective constant nominal depreciation allowance for
tax purposes per dollar of maintained capital. We estimated this concept by startingwith the
assumption that the tax law allows exponential depreciation at an annual rate d'based on his-
torical cost. (Derivation of the value of d' which best approximates the actual tax code is
described below.)
In the situation of equation (4), we consider an additional dollar of investment
which is maintained in nominal terms through subsequent replacement investment at the rate
(d—ir). Exponential depreciation for tax purposes at rate d' on this maintained investmentwill
generally not result in a constant stream of allowances. Though d' may remain constant,the
remaining basis for tax purposes does not. In particular, the basis in the first year is one dollar,
while the basis in the second year is (l—d') + (d—ir). The second year basis will not equal one
dollar if dd'+ ir. The inflation rate enters here since tax depreciation is based on historical
cost. Since the basis is nonconstant, depreciation allowances of d' times the basis arealso non-
constant.
As shown in Gordon (1980), the value of d, which is constant over time and which
implies the same present value of deductions for corporations as the nonconstantd' stream,
would satisfy:
d =d'(d—ir) + r(l—r) (14) d +r(l—r)
(For non-corporate firms, the same expression applies, except that r is replaced by m.)We
therefore can solve for d based on figures for d' and other data.24
Analogous to the economic depreciation rates d, the tax depreciation rates d' are
estimated from IRS depreciation data and time-series on investment. Looking at a particular
industry, suppose that TD, is the dollar figure for tax depreciation in the ith yearbetween 1972-19-
and 1976. We then solved for the geometric depreciation rate d' that best approximates the
observed tax depreciation allowances TD1, using a procedure similar to that used in solving for
d. If!, measures the nominal investment in a given industry which occurred in year!, then d'









TD1= c., J-_, (1—d_,)'+
/ iO + d197
Here, d, is a function of time since the relevant tax law changed several times during the
period. Also, u here refers to the growth rate for nominal investment prior to 1947, estimated
to be .057 for nonresidential investment and .059 for residential investment. In the appendix,
we describe how I, and d, were obtained. The eighteen resulting effective constant tax depreci-
ation rates d for 1973 appear in column 7 of Table 1.
7. Proprietors' Marginal Tax Rates, (m ,g)
The parameter m represents the average personal marginal tax rate paid by proprie-
tors in the non-corporate sector. In principle, this marginal tax rate should vary by industry,
but we found no data capable of providing such information. Instead, we used the NBER-
TAXSIM programs to calculate economy-wide average marginal tax rates for business income,
supplemental schedule income, partnership income, and small business corporation profits. We
then set m equal to .365, the weighted average of the average marginal tax rates for each
category of income.25
The parameter g represents the effective capital gains tax rate on rental housing. By
1973 tax law, only half of capital gains is taxable. We assumed in addition that the postpone-
ment of the tax payment until realization halves the effective tax rate. We therefore assumed
that g =.25m=.091.-20-
8. Other Parameter Values (re, e, a, ab, r, r, r)
There remain several economy wide parameters that need to be estimated for 1973.
For r2, the nominal before tax risk free interest rate, many economists have used the Treasury
bill rate, which equaled .07 in 1973. While Treasury bills are not risky in nominal terms, they
are risky in real terms. Lacking any better estimate, we assumed the risk premium in the
Treasury bill interest rate was .02, implying a risk free interest rate of .05. As a sensitivity test,
we also report results for a .07 risk free rate.
We estimated e using time series data for y and the market interest rate. According
to the theory developed in Section I, the debt-capital ratio will be in equilibrium when
c(y)= aye = r(ab—a(l—r)).This implies that
1ab—a(lr)i
log('y) =—log(a +—log(r) (16)
If a,e,a,,a, and r are all constant across time, e can be estimated by regressing log(') on
log(r) and a constant term using time series data, and taking the inverse of the estimated
coefficient of log(r). Gordon-Malkiel (1980) provide yearly data on y for the period 1958-
1978. For r, we used a yearly commercial paper rate. When we regressed log('y) on log(r), we
obtained
log(y) =—2.44+ .557 log(r)
(0.19)(.116)
where standard errors are in parentheses under the coefficient estimates.26 We therefore used
_____= 1.79as an estimate fore.
.557
Next consider a and a, the personal tax parameters for equity and bonds. There is
no need to estimate each parameter separately since it is only their ratio ab/a which matters in
any of the computations.27
Let us consider then the problem of measuring the ratio ab/a. The first problem
faced is that the tax treatment of the returns to equity depends on whether the returns take the
form of dividends or capital gains. It is not clear how to proceed since economists do not yet-21-
have a good explanation for why dividends are paid, given their unfavorable tax treatment (see
Black (1976)). By repurchasing shares, a firm can create a dollar in capital gains in lieu of pay-
ing a dollar in dividends, and presumably would do so if capital gains were valued more highly
by the market. Since firms do pay dividends, we assume that the market does value dividends
and capital gains equally. In fact, Gordon-Bradford (1980) estimate the value in the market of
dividends vs. capital gains, and find that the market value of a dollar of dividends does not
differ systematically from the market value of a dollar of capital gains. That is, dividends must
provide some other advantage which offsets their tax disadvantage. We therefore assume that
the effective tax rate on equity is the capital gains tax rate.
The ratio ab/athusmeasures the value in the market of a dollar of interest pay-
ments relative to a dollar in either dividends or capital gains. According to the derivation in
Gordon-Bradford (1980), this ratio is a weighted average of the valuation each investor gives to
interest relative to capital gains.28 The weights are proportional to the investor's wealth and
inversely proportional to a measure of his risk aversion. We therefore calculated an estimate
for ab/adirectlyfrom the twelve consumer groups of the FSW model by taking a weighted
average of their relative valuations of interest and capital gains. In doing so, we made the fol-
lowing assumptions: 1) risk preferences do not vary across consumers, 2) the effective tax rate
on capital gains is one-eighth of the tax rate on interest,29 and 3) only 70% of an individual's
investments are taxable. According to 1973 Flow of Funds data, approximately 30% of savings
were in pensions, IRA accounts, or other tax free vehicles. The implied value of cxb/awas.82.
The remaining parameters r, ,andr were directly observable. We set r=.08 and
T=.05,30basedon the data for 1973 appearing in the Economic Report of the President. We set
r=.48, the statutory tax rate in 1973.
III. Other Changes to the Fullerton, Shoven, Whalley Model
A. Modelling of Government Enterprises and General Government
The FSW model includes not only the eighteen private sectors described above but
two government sectors as well. One, government enterprises, includes government run-22-
business activities, mainly the post office and TVA. This sector was modelled like the other
private industries except that it received a large output subsidy from general government. The
other sector, general government, captures the remaining activities of government. We need to
calculate equilibrium values for p for these two "industries" comparable to those which charac-
terize the other eighteen industries to help determine the demand for capital. Unfortunately,
we do not have available the same quality of information for these two sectors.
We assume that government enterprises are cost minimizing industries which meet
all demand at the output prices dictated to them by higher levels of government. We assume
therefore that they invest until the real marginal product of their capital is just high enough to
cover depreciation, the real risk free interest rate, and a suitable risk premium, ÔG.Formally,
we assume that p= r — r + d + bGLackingany independent information about dinthis
industry, we assume that it equals the weighted average of the values in the eighteen private
industries, where the weights are the sizes of the capital stock in each industry. To construct an
estimate for ÔG,wefirst calculate for each private industry the value of the risk premium on a
dollar of capital that would prevail if there were no leverage costs (as with noncorporate invest-
ments), and if all risk were borne by the private sector. This risk premium would equal
U') •32Wethen took the weighted average of these values over the eighteen private
(1—rn)
industries.
General government includes all remaining activities of government. It receives
revenue from the various taxes and from selling its endowment of capital on the market. Part
of the total revenue is earmarked for lump sum transfers to each consumer group. The bench-
mark transfers are based on data for welfare, government retirement, food stamps, and similar
programs.33 As prices change in a simulation, government maintains the same real payments in
transfers to each group.
General government also purchases each of the nineteen producer goods (18 private
industry outputs and government enterprises output), plus capital and labor. In doing so, it is
assumed to maximize a Cobb-Douglas utility function whose arguments are these nineteen-23-
producer goods plus capital and labor.
The question here is the appropriate measure for the cost of capital to government.
Since most of the capital used in general government is used in state and local governments,34
we model capital intensity decisions in this sector as if they were entirely local public decisions.
The capital intensity of a community's public sector is in equilibrium when the
(assumed) homogeneous residents in that community are indifferent to adding an extra dollar
of capital. The community must also decide whether it is cheaper to finance its capital stock
directly through property taxes or indirectly through the municipal bond market. The key tax
factors in determining the equilibrium phereare: 1) property tax payments are deductible from
taxable personal income if the residents itemize, 2) the interest rate paid on debt is the munici-
pal bond rate, and 3) there is no tax on the "profits" of the sector.
In calculating the equilibrium marginal product of capital in the local public sector,
let us assume that 'ypercentof an additional dollar of capital investment under consideration
would be financed by debt. Let n equal the effective personal marginal tax rate at which
residents deduct property taxes.35 Then the community must put up l—y through taxes to
finance the nondebt part of the one dollar investment, at an after tax cost of (l—n)(1—-y).
Let prepresentthe dollar value in each period to residents in the community of the
marginal product of this dollar investment. Also, let rf be the nominal (tax free) municipal
bond interest rate at which the community borrows. Then, as a result of this investment,
residents receive an implicit net nominal return equal to p —'yrj(l—n)
—
(d—ir)rj/r.36Bond
holders receive yrj before and after tax.
Together the community and the bondholders have invested (I—n) (l—-y) + y dol-
lars and must absorb together the risk in the return from the investment. Because of this risk,
they demand a suitable risk premium, öG,whichwe assume equals the risk premium for
government enterprises. Bondholders would require a risk free return of r12, the risk free mun-
icipal bond rate, while members of the community would require an after tax risk free return of




We find solving for p that
p =(d—7r)rf/r +(1—n) abr2— yUln)abr2+ nr1—r12) + 5G (18)
The required value for p is lower when y is larger. Therefore the community would
use only debt finance unless marginal leverage costs are sufficiently large. We will assume that
y=l,implyingthat p =(d—ir)rj/r+ rf2—nrf +ÔG. The equilibrium p here is lower than that
for government enterprises because of both the income tax deductibility of property tax pay-
ments and the availability of municipal bond interest rates.
Similarly, property taxes paid to cover other local government expenses are deducti-
ble from the Federal personal income tax. In particular, the after tax cost of hiring one more
dollar of labor services is only (1—n)dollars.We therefore include an n percent factor subsidy
to labor in this industry. Current expenditures on any of the nineteen commodities also cost
(1—n) percent of the market price.37
In order to calculate values for p and the labor factor subsidy in this industry, we
need values for d,6G'r1, r12, and n. We set dand6G equal to the same weighted averages
used for government enterprises.
We also assumed that municipal bond interest rates are a given fraction 8ofthe
interest rates on taxable bonds, so that rj=8r and r12=0r2. Gordon-Malkiel (1980) measure 8
tobe .75.
Incalculating a value for n, several steps were involved. First, according to the
NBER-TAXSIM file, the weighted average marginal tax rate in 1975 for those who itemized
and deducted property tax payments was .260. In making this calculation, an individual's tax
rate was weighted by the size of his property tax payments.38 We assume that the same rate
applied in 1973. However, not all property owners itemize. Using unpublished data from the-25-
NationalIncome Division of the Commerce Department along with the figures from the TAX-
SIM file, we infer that only 44.8 percent of property taxes paid on residential property was in
fact deducted from taxable income. This implies that the average marginal value of n equals
(.448)(.260) =.117.
This calculation, however, ignores the possibility that industrial and commercial pro-
perty may pay part of the costs of additional local public services. In fact, only two-thirds of
property tax receipts come from residential property. When considering the effective property
tax rate on business investment in earlier sections, we decided to explore the two alternative
assumptions that: 1) benefits completely offset taxes at the margin, and 2) firms (except in real
estate) receive benefits which offset half of their property taxes. In the first scenario, we set
n =.117becausehouseholds are subsidized in their local public good "purchases" by the deduc-
tibility of their property taxes. Households receive no further subsidy or benefits from taxing
businesses, because competitive pressure prevents communities from collecting any tax from
firms without paying for commensurate benefits to them.
In the second scenario, however, half of industrial property taxes are left for ser-
vices to residential property. (The other half of the revenues from business property are used
to provide services to the firms.) Consider, for the moment, $1.20 of local property 'tax reve-
nue. One-third or $40 on average would be paid by businesses. They would receive $.20 in
benefits, which leaves exactly $1.00 for residential benefits. Residents then would pay only
$80 for a dollar of benefits, at a cost of $.80 (1-.l17)$.707 after taxes. We therefore use
(l-.707).293 for n when simulating the second scenario.
B. Measurementof Initial Capital Stocks
In the FSW model, net corporate earnings (NCE) after tax and after depreciation
were assumed to be proportional to the true capital stock (i.e. to equal rK, where r is the same
for all industries). Therefore, NCE/r provided a measure of the capital stock in each indus-
try.39-26-
According to the model in this paper, the size of corporate earnings relative to the
underlying capital stock will depend on many factors such as the risk premium, tax vs. true
depreciation rates, etc. However, expected gross corporate earnings (GCE), before tax and
before depreciation ought to equal pK. Pc was defined in Section II,B as the cost of capital
gross of tax and depreciation, and varies by industry. We therefore used GCE/p as a measure
of the corporate capital stock in each industry.
Here, GCE was defined to equal the sum of:
I) corporate profits, from the Survey of Current Business (SCB) corrected for the Inventory
Valuation Adjustment
2) corporate capital consumption allowances, from the SCB
3) corporate interest payments, from unpublished data of the Commerce Department's
National Income Division (NID), and
4) corporate rental payments. Rents paid by industry were available from NID, and we
divided these into corporate and non-corporate payments in the same proportions that the
sum of other earnings were divided in each industry.
The same procedure will not work for the non-corporate sector since earnings there
are also in part labor income of the proprietors. Instead we assumed that within any industry,
capital consumption allowances are proportional to the capital stock. We then multiplied our
estimate of the corporate capital stock in each industry by the ratio of non-corporate to cor-
porate capital consumption allowances in that industry to produce an estimate of the non-
corporate capital stock. This logic also helps provide estimates of initial (1973) labor income in
the non-corporate sector. If K p,. is equal to before tax earnings of capital, and GPE is gross
proprietor's earnings, then GPE —Kp,. equals imputed labor income. Here, GPE is defined
to equal the sum of non-corporate profits (from the SCB), non-corporate capital consumption
allowances (from NID), interest paid (from NID), and rents paid. Non-corporate rents were
imputed by the above procedure. if this residual for labor in 1973 turned out to be negative,
we assumed there was measurement error and used zero for the initial non-corporate labor in-27-
that industry.
For the two government sectors, we used estimates from Musgrave (1980) for the
size of the 1973 capital stocks.
C. Measurement of Capital Income, Before and After Tax
The FSW model defined total capital income net of tax and depreciation to equal the
sum of corporate profits, capital consumption adjustment, net interest paid, net rents paid, and
non-corporate returns to capital. In the new model, we set total capital income equal to
K(p—d). The major differences from the old procedure are: 1) depreciation is measured by the
calculated dK rather than by reported capital consumption allowances with capitalconsumption
adjustment, and 2) non-corporate capital income is in effect measured by K(p,—d) rather
than by the reported data for non-corporate capital income.40
Let tkequalthe average capital tax rate. We initially set tkequalto the ratio of
observed 1973 capital taxes to before tax capital income, K(p—d). In simulations, netcapital
income then equals K(p—d)(1—tk) and capital tax revenue equals K(p—d)tk. Calculation of
the benchmark equilibrium replicates observed capital taxes in 1973, while appropriatechanges
Ifl tk(togetherwith changes in r,k,d', etc.) allow simulation of counterfactual equilibria.
D. Savings Incentives
While the procedure described above provides estimates for the capital stock in the
initial equilibrium, the capital stock in the next period will equal this initial capital stock,plus
net savings undertaken during the initial period by the twelve separate consumergroups. The
capital stock in later periods will follow in a similar fashion. While we made much effort in this
paper to improve the modelling of investment decisions (by taking account of uncertainty and
the optimal form of finance), we made few changes to the assumptions about individualsavings
decisions found in the earlier model.
In the FSW model, individuals in each consumer group j1,12 choose tosave some
income to finance future consumption Cj. They allocate the rest to a subutility function,H,-28-
which is defined over fifteen consumption goods X, and leisure .Thefifteen X1 consumption
goods enter a Cobb-Douglas function with preference parameters X. as exponents. Specifically,




As in the FSW model, we use .15 for the uncornpensated labor supply elasticity of
each group with respect to its net of tax wage. This parameter is used to set the elasticity of
substitution for the inner nest, between consumption goods and leisure. Unlike the FSW
model, however, we cannot use a savings elasticity with respect to the real after tax interest
rate. In our model, this rate will normally be negative. Instead, we use 12.3 as the uncompen-
sated savings elasticity with respect to one plus the real after tax interest rate. This parameter
is used to set the elasticity of substitution for the outer nest, between present and future con-
sumption. The 12.3 figure was derived from Boskin's (1978) equation (2). Boskinestimated
that log C =A—l.07R, where C is consumption, R is the real net of tax interest rate, and A
represents other variables in his equation. But therefore, log C A—1.07 log(1+R).It then
follows that1±R35=1.07(--).
In1973, the ratio of total consumption to net sav-
ings was 11.5, from the Economic Report of the President. We then used (1.07)(11.5)12.3
for the elasticity of S with respect to l+R in all periods for all consumer groups. In spite of
many objections to Boskin's estimation procedure, we felt there was no goodalternative. Sav-
ing is then converted immediately into investment demand for producer goods.
A remaining issue is the determination of the net of tax real market interest rate
faced by each group. As in the FSW model, we assume that individuals put a fixed fraction of
their (marginal) savings into pensions, Keogh and IRA accounts, and life insurance. We
assume that such savings earn the market rate of return free of tax. Based on Flow ofFunds
data for 1973, we set this fraction equal to .3. The remaining seventy percent of their savings
is then invested either in taxable bonds or in tax free municipal bonds. The return on taxable
bonds is taxed at a constant personal tax rate m which ranges from .01 to .40 across the twelve-29-
consumergroups. Each individual can therefore earn a real net of tax risk free4' rate of return
on his savings equal to .3r + .7 max (rj, (l—m)r) —ir. Inthis expression rj represents
the risk free municipal bond rate. In the initial simulations, we set rj =.75r, based on the
results in Gordon-Malkiel (1980).
E. The Benchmark Equilibrium
The FSW model, as used here, consists of eighteen producer industries, fifteen con-
sumer goods, twelve consumer groups, plus the two government sectors. Before the model can
be simulated, production and utility functions and their parameters must be specified. The
overall strategy is to choose remaining parameters such that the model will calculate an equili-
brium that exactly replicates the consistent benchmark data set.
Each industry in the FSW model is characterized by either a constant elasticity of
substitution or a Cobb-Douglas production function. Substitution elasticities are chosen from
the best estimates in the available literature. The size of each industry's capital stock is calcu-
lated as described in Section III.B. The size of the benchmark demand for labor in the cor-
porate sector is measured by the size of the labor payments in that industry in 1973, as reported
in the Survey of Current Business. The demand for labor in the non-corporate sector is meas-
ured as gross income of the industry minus our estimate for the gross return to capital,
As in the FSW model, the parameters in the production function were then selected
such that the optimal capital-labor ratio would equal the ratio which was in fact chosen, and
such that the output produced using these factors would equal the observed 1973 output. In
doing so, the rental cost of capital was set equal to the calculated equilibrium rate p—d for that
industry. The cost of a standardized unit of labor was set equal to one plus the effective unem-
ployment compensation tax rate reported in column 1 of Table 1. Various Federal excise taxes
and indirect business taxes were modelled as output taxes for each of the eighteen industries.
As in equation (19) above, each consumer group has a nested utility function over
future consumption, leisure, and fifteen commodities. The inner-most nest is a Cobb-Douglas
utility function over the fifteen consumer goods. The X, coefficients were chosen so as to-30-
replicate observed relative expenditures on these commodities. In doing so, expenditures were
measured gross of state and local sales taxes. In the next nest, there is a CESfunctionby
which the consumer chooses between these commodities and leisure. Weights were chosen
such that individuals will choose to work forty hours out of a potential seventy hours at their
net of tax wage rate. In the outer nest of equation (19), individuals choose between current
and future consumption.
Similarly, general government has a Cobb-Douglas utility function over the nineteen
producer goods plus capital and labor.42 The parameters in this function were selected such that
optimal demands for goods, given market prices, would equal actual demands in 1973.
Finally, the foreign sector is modelled by the assumption that the net value of
exports less imports for each producer good is constant. This simple treatment closes the
model, maintains zero trade balance, and allows easy calculation of trade quantities given
prices.43
Because the data set for this model comes from many different sources, the figures
are often inconsistent. For example, Treasury data on various forms of capital income of con-
sumers differs from Commerce Department data on industry payments for capital. In such
cases, the data on one side of the account were judged to be of superior quality and the other
data were adjusted to match. All reported industry and government uses of factors were
accepted, so consumers' factor incomes and expenditures were scaled to match. Reported tax
receipts and transfers were accepted, so government expenditures were scaled to balance the
budget. The nearly balanced actual budget of 1973 luckily makes this treatment more reason-
able. Similar adjustments ensure that supply equals demand for all goods and factors.
The above assumptions guarantee that the model simulation in the initial period will
replicate the 1973 figures. The dynamic model is derived assuming that the 1973 benchmark
equilibrium lies on a steady state growth path. Observed saving behavior and the capital
endowment are translated into an annual growth rate for capital, and this growth rate is also
attributed to effective labor units. The benchmark sequence of equilibria is then calculated by-31-
maintainingall tax rates and preferences fixed, increasing labor exogenously, andallowing sav-
ing to augment capital endowments over time. By construction, thissequence will have con-
stant factor ratios and constant prices. In simulations of revised tax policies, labor growth is




A variant of Scarf's (1973) algorithm is used to solve for each equilibrium. Anew
dynamic sequence of the economy results from a change in initial conditions, such as a change
in the tax law. In each equilibrium period of the sequence, demand willequal supply for all
producer goods and factors, and each industry will have zero profits. Both capital and laborare
assumed to be homogeneous and freely mobile across industries. In addition,as described
below, we adjust personal income tax rates so as to produce a government revenue at each date
which provides the same utility to government given the new market pricesas it had in the
same period of the benchmark equilibrium sequence. We make this assumption so that in the
simulations we can focus on the changes in utility that individuals derive fromprivate activities,
holding constant the utility that individuals implicitly derive from public activities.
Simplex dimensions are required only for w,r, andthe additive surtax rate on the
personal income tax. Knowledge of these values is sufficient to evaluate the behavior of all
agents. Producer good prices are based on factor prices and zero profits, while consumer good
prices are based on producer good prices.
A complete set of prices, quantities, incomes, and allocations are calculated for
every equilibrium. A revised tax equilibrium can be compared to the benchmark equilibrium to
provide a direct examination of the effects of the proposed tax changes.
In describing the effects of any proposed tax change, we also calculate theequivalent
variation in each period. This is the lump sum dollar amount that would haveto be transferred-32-
to individuals in the benchmark equilibrium so as to give each consumer group the utility that
they would have in the revised tax equilibrium. One complication in calculating this equivalent
variation is that tax changes cause a change in the amount of risk and leverage costs, yet these
costs do not appear explicitly in the model:45 our individual utility functions implicitly include
the utility provided from spending the risk premiums, but do not explicitly subtract for the
disutility of bearing risk.
However, by assumption, the risk premiums i3orô,., measure the cost to the indi-
viduals of bearing what risk is left after taxes from their investments. In addition, the govern-
ment bears risk since its tax revenue is uncertain, yet costs of risk bearing do not appear in the
government utility function either. We assume in this paper that individuals ultimately bear
this risk in proportion to their wealth, and find it just as costly to bear as risk they receive
directly.46 In each simulation, we then measure the time pattern of consumption that each con-
sumer group would have had, everything else equal, if it did not receive the risk premium
appropriate for all the risk in the return on its capital (including that borne by the government),
but also bore no risk. Since we have then standardized utility at the point where there is no
risk, we can directly compare utilities across simulations. The reported values for the
equivalent variation refer to this standardized measure for utility.47
B. Tax Distortions on Capital in the Initial Equilibrium
In our initial simulations with the model, we left all tax rates at their observed
values in 1973, thereby replicating the historical equilibrium. The results from this simulation
provide us with a benchmark ftom which we can examine the welfare effects of several pro-
posed tax changes.
The key element that characterizes each of the simulations that we undertake is the
function relating the market interest rate rtothe equilibrium marginal product of capital p in
each industry. The formula used in calculating p in the initial equilibrium was derived in Sec-
tion II. The equilibrium p is a weighted average of the values p and p,.,, characterizing cor-
porate and non-corporate investment.-33-
In the first three columns of Table 2, we report the equilibrium values by industry
for




and their weighted average by industry, defined as s. Here we assume that the property tax is
nondistorting. Each of these figures represents the nominal return required by investors in that
industry before any taxes but after depreciation. These returns are measured net of compensa-
tion for the riskness in the return and net of any leverage costs. As such, they also represent
the nominal social marginal product of the investment, net of the social costs from deprecia-
tion, risk, and leverage costs.48
Were there no corporation tax, the risk free nominal return on corporate capital s
ought to equal the risk free nominal market interest rate r = .05. This equivalence would hold
even if there were a (comprehensive) personal income tax on the nominal return from all
forms of saving. Had we just used the simplified modelling of the corporate tax as a flat tax
rate on the nominal return to corporate capital, as did Harberger (1962), then Swouldequal
or .096 with our parameters. In sharp contrast, the equihbnum values of s reported in
1—i-
Table 2 are not only well below .096 but are also mostly below .05. In fact, the weighted aver-
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canre-express s (without the property tax) as:




The following factors, identifiable in this formula, account for the surprisingly low value for s:
a, T2
1)Equity holders require an after-corporate-tax return of only ,notr1, since a
the personal income tax rate on the alternative risk free asset earning r exceeds the personal
tax rate on corporate equity. This lowers s from toa(1—r) ,whichequals .079.-34-
2) The use of debt finance has multiple effects. First, the required nominal risk free
rate of return on debt before corporate taxes is only r= .05.Since on average 40 percent of
capital is financed by debt, siSthereby lowered to (.079)(.6) -I- (.05)(.4)= Second,
abpercentof the risk premium on bonds is received by bondholders after tax, while only
a(l—r) percent of the risk remains on the investment after taxes. This exchange is favorable
to investors, lowering .c by another .007.
3) The inflationary capital gains component of the nominal return .r, is not subject to
ni. thecorporate tax. This lowers the equilibrium value of 5 by .055.
I —i
4)Partially offsetting this, the effective tax depreciation rate disbelow the
economic depreciation rate ddueto depreciation at historical cost in the tax law. This raises s
onaverage by .033.
5) Finally the availability of the investment tax credit lowers the equilibrium s,by
.002.
The equilibrium values of the non-corporate s,.. are also normally below rbecause
of the above explanations #3 and #5,morethan offsetting explanation #4. The nominal
equilibrium return to all capital sison average only .034 (in column 3 of Table 2).
The equilibrium marginal time preference rate of individuals will also be well below
rbecauseof the personal income tax. The weighted average marginal time preference rate5°
for our twelve consumer groups turns out to be .043. Therefore, while individuals require a
return of .043 on their savings, the resulting investment produces a net return of only .034.
An implicit government subsidy of .009 makes up the difference. Tax distortions therefore
result in an inefficiently large amount of savings and investment. (When we assume that the
property tax is half distorting in industries other than real estate, there will still be a small net
subsidy to savings and investment.)
If this distortion is negative, though small, why is so much tax revenue collected on
the return to capital, from both the corporate and personal income taxes? The explanation for-35-
this apparent puzzle is that most (in fact more than all, according to our figures) of the taxable
expected return is the risk premium. Yet while a significant per cent of the risk premium is
taxed away, the same percent of the risk (standard deviation) is absorbed by the government
through risky tax revenues. According to the capital asset pricing model, investors demand a
risk premium proportional to the amount of risk that they bear. Investors are therefore
indifferent when they lose to the government a given per cent of both the risk premium and
the risk, so their behavior is undistorted. The government is just charging the market price for
the risk that it absorbs. Since the risk premium is positive, however, expected tax revenues
will be positive.
Even if the saving-investment distortion is small, however, other tax distortions
remain. First, the variation of the numbers in column 3 of Table 2 implies an intersectoral
misallocation of capital across industries, as emphasized in Harberger (1962). In addition, sav-
ings is misallocated across individuals because of the variation in after-tax rates of return across
investors. (Efficiency requires the same marginal time preference rate for each investor, and
thus the same available after tax rate of return.) Also, as always, labor supply decisions are dis-
torted because of the personal tax. Finally, in our initial simulation, yearly leverage related
costs are estimated to equal .7 per cent of the value of the corporate capital stock, or .6 per cent
of GNP. This is hardly an insigniflcant figure.
C. Modelling of the Proposed Tax Revision
The model in this paper is used to evaluate the general equilibrium effects of
integrating corporate and personal taxes. Detailed descriptions of such proposals can be found
in McLure (1975, 1979). Under the full integration proposal, as modelled in Fullerton, King,
Shoven and Whalley (1980, 1981), the corporate tax would be eliminated. Instead, corporate
earnings would be included in the personal income tax base of each of the shareholders in pro-
portion to their holdings, and would be taxed at ordinary personal income tax rates.51
Several changes must be made in the model to capture the effects of this tax change.
First, equation (4) relating Pc and rchangessubstantially. Corporate profits would now be-36-
taxedat each investor'sordinary tax rate, regardless of corporate financial decisions. Since the
taxdistortionfavoring debt finance is thereby eliminated, y goes to zero. There is now no
offsetting advantagetocounterbalance the leverage costs arising from debt finance. As a result,
leveragerelatedcosts go to zero as well.
Afterintegration, the corporation would betreatedfor tax purposes as if it were a
partnership.The only reason why p now differs from isthat the average marginal tax rates
of corporate and non-corporate investors differ.52 We previously estimated that the marginal tax
rate of non-corporate investors equaled .365. Let mequalthe average marginal tax rate of
12
corporate investors after integration. We set mCequalto .7w1m,whichequals .1948.
i—I
Here, theare the marginal tax rates of the twelve consumer groups, and the warethe pro-
portions of consumer wealth held by each group.53 We continue to assume that only 70% of
capital income is taxable.
The saftercorporate tax integration can therefore be obtained from the sformula
in equation (20), with m= .365replaced by mC.l948.The resulting figures, reported in
column 4 of Table 2, are calculated under the assumption that r2remainsunchanged at .05, to
ensure comparability with the other figures in Table 2. (In the simulations, as r2changes,all
the swillchange in response.) Note that tax integration will not affect the equilibrium value of
s,.,holdingrconstant.We find that the new values for s.exceedthe (new and old) values
for s,..Investingin real capital is advantageous during inflation since inflationary capital gains
escape full taxation. This advantage is greater in the non-corporate sector where the marginal
tax rate is greater. (Use of historical cost depreciation is more of a disadvantage when marginal
tax rates are greater, but this effect is not as important.)
The relation between the values for sbeforeand after integration is more compli-
cated. The advantage to investing in real capital, where inflationary capital gains escape full tax-
ation, declines with integration since the ordinary marginal tax rate on the return to capital
declines. Offsetting this, however, the required before tax risk free nominal return on equity
abr
financedcapital was before integration, while the required return declines to rafter
a(1—r)-37-
integration, regardless of the form of finance.
When we assume that property taxes are half distorting in all industries except hous-
ing, then the equilibrium values for s,s,, ands,withor without integration, all go up by the
values for t,,reportedin column 2 of Table I. In columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 we report expli-
citly the resulting values for sbeforeand after corporate tax integration.
In addition to recalculating the values for s,weneed to calculate how government
revenues change each period as a result of corporate tax integration. Clearly, corporate tax
revenues go to zero. However, corporate earnings, whether retained or paid out as dividends,
become fully taxable under the personal income tax. The new average tax rate on capital
income, zj,,isset equal to the ratio of these revised capital taxes to the capital income,
K(p—d), in the benchmark equilibrium. These new taxes include only property tax payments
(when relevant) and personal income tax payments, as they would be with no corporate tax but
with full personal taxation of all corporate earnings. (These personal income tax payments will
be referred to as the personal factor tax.) Tax revenue from taxation of capital income in the
revised equilibrium will then equal t,,K'(p'—d),where primes denote the values in the revised
equilibrium.
We simulated corporate tax integration under several sets of assumptions in order to
test the sensitivity of the results to the different specifications. Table 3 summarizes the param-
eter values assumed in each of the simulations. The basic simulation, summarized under Case
I", assumes that half of the property tax was distorting in all industries except real estate, where
it was assumed to be nondistorting.
In order to make up for lost tax revenue in this simulation, we assumed that all per-
sonal tax rates would be raised by a uniform scalar amount. This scalar increase in tax rates
was chosen in each period so that government had just enough revenue to attain the utility
level that it had in the same period of the benchmark sequence. In particular, we added the
same scalar to the following tax rates:-38-
thepersonal tax rates of the twelve consumer groups (j=l,12)
in , thepersonal tax rate of proprietors
the personal tax rate of corporate owners with integration
n , theimplicit rate of subsidy for purchase 02localpublic goods
—rj2/r,theimplicit tax rate on municipal bonds.
Each of the other simulations represents a slight variation from this central case
simulation. In the second simulation, we assumed that the property tax was nondistorting in all
industries. In this case property tax revenues are deleted from government revenues in both
base and revised simulations. Property taxes are implicitly treated as benefit payments for pub-
lic 'consumer goods" or intermediate inputs in production.
In the third simulation, we set the risk free rate to .07, the treasury bill rate in 1973.
This change affected the parameterization of the benchmark equilibrium, which was carried
through to the new revised equilibrium.
Finally, in the fourth simulation, we assumed that any extra tax revenue needed to
maintain government utility is raised through a lump sum tax on individuals. The amount of
extra tax paid by each group is proportional to their original after-tax incomes, but the extra tax
has no price effects. While this case is unrealistic, it allows us to isolate the effects of changing
the tax distortions on capital income. (With additions to personal income tax rates, there are
further distortions in labor-leisure choices.)
D. SimulationResults
Tables4-6 present some of the information from our simulations of corporate and
personal tax integration. As a basis of comparison, we extended the consistent 1973 bench-
mark economy to a sequence of seven equilibria spaced five years apart. Each equilibria is pro-
portionately larger than the previous one, with all values growing at the steady state rate. For a
revised case, the first period has the same total capital as in the benchmark. The endogenous
savings response determines capital stock in the six subsequent periods, again spaced five years-39-
apart. With disproportionate growth, however, we need to interpolate values for intervening
years. For each variable, we calculate the annual growth rate implied by its values from two
successive periods. This rate is applied to the value from the first of those periods to obtain
values for each year between them.
Table 4 presents equivalent variations for all 31 years, each measured relative to
national income in the corresponding year of the benchmark simulation. The seven actual
equilibrium calculations are reflected in years 1, 6, 11, 16, 21, 26, and 31. while other years'
values are obtained using interpolated data.
Table 5 summarizes results by looking at just a few key variables in each of the
seven periods. Each entry is the ratio of the revise-case value to the base-case value of the
same period. A capital stock ratio less than one, for example, does not imply reduced capital
stock over time; it only implies less capital than in the growing benchmark sequence.
Table 6 shows the reallocation of the fixed total capital stock in the first period. The
entry for each industry is the percent change in capital used in the first period of the revised
sequence from the first period of the base sequence.
Integration of the corporate income tax with the personal income tax may seem like
a dramatic change in the tax law. indeed, Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whailey (1980, 1981)
find significant welfare gains from integration. However, the results here indicate that the
effects on the economy would be very modest. Except when revenues are replaced by a lump
sum tax, Table 4 shows that the tax change results in a very slight drop in the utility from
current consumption of commodities and leisure during at least the first thirty years after the
tax change.
Net welfare losses occur with integration when the revenue is replaced by raising
personal tax rates, because the labor-leisure distortion is exacerbated.56 This over-all loss occurs
in spite of welfare improvements on three other margins.
First, integration eliminates the distortion favoring debt finance, removing the lever-
age costs that were .6% of benchmark national income.-40-
Second, inter-industry welfare gains follow along the lines of previous Harberger-
type analyses, as indicated in the last two columns of Table 2. The generally high required
rates of return in manufacturing are lowered, while the low required rates of return in real
estate and petroleum refining are raised.
Third, there are welfare effects on the intertemporal allocation of consumption.
Table 2 shows that the average siSa bit higher with integration, whether or not the property
tax was modelled as distorting. Integration reduces the small net subsidy to the risk free return
on savings, discussed in an earlier section. These three welfare effects are summarized in the
fourth simulation of Table 4, where revenue losses with integration are recovered through
lump-sum taxes. Together they imply a slight welfare gain from integration alone. Without
changing personal tax rates, labor supply remains basically unchanged. If personal tax rates
have to rise, however, the first three columns of Table 4 indicate a net welfare loss from
integration. We find hat the resulting drop in labor supply creates the largest welfare effect.
We probably underestimate the welfare cost of this drop in labor supply because we ignore
some existing distortions to labor supply created by various transfer programs such as food
stamps and AFDC. In the first period of the central case, labor supply drops by 1.4% in
response to the .026 rise in marginal tax rates. The figures for the second and third cases are
very similar.
In the third case, where r= .07in the benchmark equilibrium, the equivalent varia-
tion figures are even less favorable. It turns out that the benchmark intersectoral misallocation
of capital and the intertemporal savings-investment distortion are slightly smaller in this case.
The smaller gains from integration on those margins are offset by the same size loss from rais-
ing personal tax rates, for a larger net loss over-all.
Because of the drop in labor supply with a fixed initial supply of capital, capital-labor
ratios rise in the first period in all sectors except general government. In order to encourage
this increase in capital-labor ratios, the cost of capital must fall. The last two columns of Table
2 show that with no change in interest rates, integration would imply a higher cost of capital on-41-
average. Therefore, the market interest rate must fall initially, as seen in Table 5. The lower
interest rate causes a fall in savings. The resulting reduction in the growth rate of the capital
stock allows r to rise back up slightly above .05.
When r =.07,however, the tax change tends to increase the Cost of capital rela-
abr
tivelyless (since lowering to r2 becomes more important). In this simulation, interest
a(l—r)
rates have to rise to offset the stronger investment incentive resulting from the tax change.
Note also that when labor supply does not fall, as when lump sum taxes are used to replace lost
tax revenue, the story is reversed. Interest rates initially rise in order to maintain an
unchanged capital-labor ratio. The resulting savings rate is sufficiently high, however, that
interest rates must fall later to create demand for all the resulting capital.
Capital-labor ratios do not rise uniformly, however. Capital is reallocated slightly
across sectors in response to the tax change, as shown for the first period in Table 6. Capital
tends to leave the industries that are little affected by the tax changes: government57, the pri-
marily non-corporate industries (#'s 1 and 17), and, to a lesser degree, industries which are
heavily debt financed initially (#'s 16, 17, and 18). The major impetus for this reallocation of
capital is the change in s, resulting from the tax change, but many other factors are also
nunIuea-llnrliirlednrnnnothecenther fQrtnrc re the rplot.,ie 017P nf the Pnrnnrnte certar the
relativesize of the drop in leverage costs, and varying factor substitution elasticities in each
industry.
We also see from Table 5 that current consumption (of both commodities and lei-
sure) falls eventually except when lump sum taxes are used to replace lost revenue. In cases I
and 2, this fall in consumption results mainly from the fall in potential output caused by the fall
in the capital stock. In case 3 it results from the rise in interest rates which shifts income into
savings. These current consumption figures are less interesting than the equivalent variation
figures, however, since they do not control for the amount of risk bearing. Note that risk bear-
ing increases initially (in spite of the elimination of leverage costs) because of the reallocation
of capital towards riskier industries.-42-
In addition to these four simulations, we ran several others, not reported here,
which produced very similar results. In particular, the assumption that property taxes on hous-
ing are also half distorting made almost no difference to the results. Also, raising extra tax
revenues through a proportional rather than an additive increase in all personal tax ratesmade
little difference.
V.Conclusions
Previousversions of the FSW model have assumed that marginal tax rates equal
average tax rates and that government expenditures are nondistoring.In this paper we have
reexamined the modelling of many of these marginal tax and benefit distortions. Particular
attention was paid to the modelling of the effect of taxes on financial and investment decisions
of corporations and local public governments.
We found that average tax rates provide a poor characterization of government
created distortions.In the cases of the Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and
Workmen's Compensation programs, we have argued that individuals receive extra government
benefits which would come close to offsetting any extra taxes they pay on the margin, as well as
on average. We also argued that recipients of capital income receivebenefits which largely
compensate them for the taxes they pay and often more than compensatethem. However, this
compensation comes in a subtle form: these recipients are able to reduce someof the risk in
the return on their investments by transferring it to the government through risky tax revenue.
We also found that the tax distortion favoring corporate use of debt rather than equity finance
is quite costly from a social point of view.
Our results also emphasize the importance of using a general equilibrium model to
evaluate welfare effects in a second best world. The current model simultaneously accounts for
tax distortions in corporate financial decisions, in the interindustry (and private vs. govern-
ment) allocations of labor and capital, in the intertemporal allocation of consumption, andin
the labor/leisure choice of individuals. Concentration on only some of these distortions can
give a very misleading view of the effects of integrating the corporate income taxwith the-43-
personal income tax. In particular, we find that the extra distortion costs caused by raising per-
sonal income tax rates to restore government revenue more than offset the efficiency gains
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!'CIT =CorporateIncome Tax, PFT =PersonalFactor Tax (explained in the text),
PT =PropertyTax. Only the distorting part of observed 1973 property tax revenues
are added to the numerator. For case 2, no PT is in the numerator of either base a
revised average tax rates. PFT' indicates a changed PFT (see text).
text for descriptions.
Benchmark Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4Table 4:
Equivalent Variations Relative to National Income for Each Year,






































































































































































Key Variables Relative to the Benchmark, Over Five YearPeriods
for Integration of Corporate and Personal Taxes
(Revise Value/Base Value)
1.Central Case
2. No Property Tax Case
3. r =.07Case













2 0,9982 0.9798 0.99i.4 1.0039
3 o.994 0.931 0.9906 1.0110
4 0.9972 0.9639 0.9J 1.016
0.9972 0.941 0.93j 1.0130
6 • 0.9912 0.9341 0.9901 1.0131
7 0.9972 0.9341 0.991 1.0131
1 1.0009 0.9750 1.0000 0.9870
2 09985 0.9847 0.9945 3.0071
3 0.9980 0.9•71 0.9931 1.0121
4 0.997d 0.9877 0.9923 1.0133
5 0.9978 0.9878 0.9927 1.0135
6 0.9978 0.9879 0.9927 1.0136
7 0.997t3 O.9b79 0.9927 1.0136
1 0.9933 1.0078 1.0000 1.0320
2 0.9991 1.0050 1.0013 1.0275
3 0.9993 1.0043 ],003 1.02ó3
4 0.9993 1.0041 1.0024 1.0259
5 0.9993 1.0039 1.0025 1.0259
6 0.9994 1.0044 1.0025 1.02b1
7 0.9994 1.0039 1.0026 1.0256
1 0.9994 1.0189 1.0033 1.0111
2 1.0013 1.0110
-1.0042----- 0.9952
3 1.00)7 1.0092 1,00t2 0.9917
4 1.00)8 1.00o6 1.00,4 0,9909



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.This underestimation of welfare losses from the replacement tax serves to strengthen our
result that this welfare loss more than offsets welfare gains from integration, as discussed
below.
2.For a discussion of the interindustry labor misallocations and general equilibrium
incidence effects caused by this tax/subsidy system, see McLure (1977).
3.For an earlier introduction of an endogenous debt-equity decision into a Harberger (1962)
style general equilibrium model, see Ballentine and McLure (1981).
4.This version of the capital asset pricing model allows for an arbitrary variation in tax rates
across investors and across types of return (e.g. interest payments vs. capital gains). The key
assumptions underlying the mode! are: 1) investors care only about the mean and the variance
in the return on their portfolio, 2) only returns taxed at capital gains rates are stochastic, 3)
capital gains are taxed at accrual, 4) there are no short sales constraints, and 5) the tax law
allows for full loss offset. The latter assumption, as stated, is clearly false. A firm with tax
hcth Qh1itJ huivr tr Irrv h kwrt nd frwrd tr nthr ty vr nd it ...-_..--.J —.-.—
hasthe option to merge with a firm with taxable profits. Moreover, we are concerned with the
marginal investment and not necessarily the marginal firm. Most of these marginal investments
will be undertaken by pre-existing firms that are, on average, profitable. Any loss on such a
marginal investment would only serve to reduce the taxable profits of such a firm. We assume
that, given these possibilities, full loss offset is a reasonable first approximation.
5.If there were no bankruptcy costs, but merely a transfer of risk to bondholders, then the
firm still has the incentive to move to all debt finance, as shown in Modigliani-Miller (1963).
6.The form of the function c(-y),andso the optimal value of 'y, will vary by firm.
7.To the extent that others are hurt but cannot charge the firm for their costs, even ex-ante,F-2
then this measure is an underestimate of the private costs of leverage.
8.Differentiating the right hand side with respect to yandequating to zero implies that
d
r(ab—a(l—r)) = —i---—. Thisequation is just the equilibrium condition for an optimal debt-
d
capitalratio derived above, where
—i—-—correspondsto c(y).
9.SeeGordon (1980) for a derivation.
10. Hall-Jorgenson also describe tax depreciation allowances in terms of their present value Z
rather than the equivalent constant flow d.
11.There are no explicit estimates for the proportion of housing capital that is owner occu-
pied. Using numbers from the Statistical Abstract, we multiplied the number of homeowners by
the median value of owner-occupied homes, and then divided by the value of the total housing
stock. These figures reveal that although approximately 65%ofhouseholds own their own
homes, 85% of the value of housing stock is owner-occupied.
12. Too little is known about the responsiveness to tax parameters of the decision to incor-
porate to model this decision explicitly.
13. We assume that the bond risk premium r—r2 equals a given pre-set value in all contexts.
It would have been preferable to allow it to vary by industry and across simulations. Lacking
the information necessary to do this seriously, we did not attempt to do it at all. Fortunately,
sensitivity analysis indicates that the value of the risk premium r—rhasvery little effect on the
value of p.
14. The application of the Tiebout model to the property tax depends critically on the availa-
bility of zoning regulations (see Hamilton (1976)). The argument does not apply to state and
local income (wage) taxes, where zoning is not available to enforce the creation of communities
with homogeneous income as well as homogeneous tastes for public services. We therefore
continue to treat state and local income taxes as distorting taxes.F- 3
15. COMPUSTAT is a data set complied by Standard and Poors Corporation, containing bal-
ance sheet information on many publicly traded corporations.
16. Only the book value of debt is reported on the COMPUSTAT tape. We used figures from
von Furstenburg, Malkiel, and Watson (1980) on each industry's average ratio of market value
to book value of debt to construct figures for the market value of debt for each firm on the
tape. When the ratio of the market value of debt to the book value of debt was not available
for a specific industry, we applied the economy wide ratio to the firms of that industry.
17. The debt-value ratio, as calculated here, will differ slightly from the debt-capital ratio used
in the theory, however. In particular, a dollar raised in the market is sufficient to purchase
(1k)
dollars of capital yet is valued in the market at a dollar. Therefore the calculated debt-
value ratio would equal(I—k) ,where-y is the debt-capital ratio.
18. We used the estimates from Merton's Model 3, estimated over the time period 1962-
1978.
19. There may be other reasons besides taxes to prefer debt finance, however.
20. By inherent risk, we refer to risk associated with the capital asset, regardless of financing,
and regardless of taxes.
21. Noncorporate investors may not have the same ability to spread risk, however, since their
securities are not publicly traded so they may require a larger risk premium. The tax system
may discourage incorporation where risk bearing is more efficient, but we ignore this tax distor-
tion and assume that the risk premium required per unit risk is indeed the same.
22. These are the two years for which the best data were available. The same 7% credit rate
applied from 1971 to 1975.
23. See, for example, Christenson -Jorgenson(1969) and Hulten-Wykoff (1980).F-4
24. In the simulations, d'iskept constant, while dvariesdue to changes in r,r, orm
25. Incalculating capital income in each category to use as weights, we followed the Treasury
Department procedure of assuming that only 30% of business income, partnership income, and
small business corporation income is really return to capital, the rest being return to labor. We
would like to thank Daniel Feenberg for performing these calculations for us.
26. Of course, if any of the terms assumed to be constant had varied significantly over time,
then the estimate of ecouldbe biased. Probably the most important problem is that any
increase in the riskiness in the economy during the period would have caused the function c(-y)
toshift upwards, raising the parameter a. If this had occurred, our estimate of eshouldbe too
high, implying that our estimate of leverage costs may be too small.
27. The only place where aappearsalone is in the term .However,,while
a(l—r)
defined to be the after tax risk premium, is estimated in this paper as in others by using before
personal tax data. The resulting estimate therefore equalsdirectly, avoiding any need for a
separate estimate of a.
28. Some authors, e.g. Miller (1977), have constructed models with sharp clientele effects.
where ab/awouldequal the marginal tax rate of the marginal individual investing in bonds
rather than stocks. All other individuals specialize in either bonds or stocks. However, in a
model with uncertainty and no short sales constraints, as in Gordon-Bradford (1980), all inves-
tors will hold some amount (positive or negative) of both types of investment, so that everyone
is a marginal investor.
29. Only one half of capital gains was taxable in 1973. In addition, the effective tax rate is
approximately halved due to the postponement of tax payments until realization. We assume it
is about halved again due to the mark up of the basis at death, and due to the selective realiza-
tion of capital losses sooner than capital gains.F- 5
30. While r represents the expected inflation rate, we set it equal to the observed rate on the
assumption of myopic expectations.
one
31.This equation can be derived from equation (7) by setting(1)
equal to 0G'andset-
ting k, t,!andrn,equalto zero.
one
32.The extra term (1—k)entersbecause measures the risk premium required for all
(1-rn)




33. While the former (FSW) model includes social security and unemployment compensation
payments as part of the government's lump sum transfers, our model assumes these net out at
the industry level.
34. According to the figures in Musgrave (1980), 72% of the capital stock in this sector is
owned by state and local governments.
35. This rate n is equal to the personal marginal tax rate, if (homogeneous) residents in the
community itemize, and is equal to zero if they do not itemize. In the calculations, we use a
weighted average value for n, as described below.
36. This expression captures the annual flows to community residents when they make a
municipal investment, maintained in nominal terms through the reinvestment of (d—ir) each
year. This subsequent capital loss and reinvestment is also assumed to be financed by issuing
municipal bonds, generating an after-tax interest expense in each future year of
(d—ir)rj(l—n). We then need the present value of these costs in the year the capital loss
takes place. Because individuals could have made non-municipal investments with an after tax
return r(l—n), their relevant discount rate is r(l—n). The present value of the stream of
interest payments (d—r)rj(1--n), in the year of the capital loss itself, is (d—ir)rj/r.F-6
37. One might argue, however, that these implicit subsidies to local public expenditures are to
a degree Pigovian subsidies which correct for the spillover of benefits to other communities.
To that degree, they are nondistorting. In this paper, however, we assume that these subsidies
are distorting.
38. We would like to thank Daniel Feenberg for performing these calculations for us.
39.Interest payments and rental payments are included in NCE so as to capture the return to
bond and land owners as well as equity owners.
40. Data are available only for total non-corporate income I and for the number of non-
corporate workers L. FSW set the non-corporate wage rate w equal to the observed average
wage rate from the corporate part of that industry, then set initial (1973) non-corporate capital
income equal to I—wL. In this paper, we instead calculate a net rate of return to capital p,,—d,
then set initial non-corporate labor income equal to I—K,.(p—d).
41. We assume that savers respond to the real net of tax risk free rate of return. Although
they can obtain a higher real after tax return by accepting risk, this premium is not inherently
part of the return to savings, It is a return to accepting risk.
42. We use this aggregate function to capture the utility created by government expenditures,
rather than having government expenditures enter directly into production functions or each
consumer group's utility function. Because we always hold government utility constant in the
simulations described below, this treatment will not affect our estimates of changes in consumer
welfare attributable to tax policy changes.
43. Goulder, Shoven, and Whalley (1981) suggest that the results may be sensitive to this
assumption.
44. We assume that the relative wealth of the twelve consumer groups remains unchanged
over time. While the groups save different proportions of income, the unmodelled movement
of individuals across our twelve groups over time ought to maintain the initial wealthF- 7
distribution.
45. Corporations take account of leverage costs when making investment decisions at the mar-
gin, but these costs are never actually subtracted from firms' profits.
46. Diamond (1967) provides a formal argument for this assumption. Also, we assume that
individuals view the risk they bear indirectly as a lump sum tax, even though we apply this
tax' in proportion to their (initial) wealth. We could have distributed the lump-sum tax in
proportion to (initial) income, but the results would be very similar. The difference between
these two procedures is only a lump-sum redistribution, which has general equilibrium effects
only to the degree that individual preferences for commodities differ.
47. The FSW model calculated the discounted sum of this stream of equivalent variations to
obtain a present value of welfare gains. The proper discount rate, however, is the real after tax
interest rate, which in our model is negative. The present value of any stream of gains or
losses would then be infinite. Instead, we report the stream directly.
48. We assume that risk borne by the government has the same social Cost as risk remaining
in the private sector, as would be implied by efficient risk spreading. The risk terms in equa-
tion (20) then do indeed correct for the social costs of the risk created by the marginal invest-
ment. We also assume that the measure of leverage costs included in t5capturesthe social
costs of leverage. If the government bears risk more cheaply, then there is a social benefit
from taxes on capital income due to the resulting redistribution of risk.
49. Also, leverage costs per unit capital are raised to .007, as implied by equation (11),
though this does not show up in equation (21) since s is net of leverage costs.
50. The marginal time preference rate for consumer group jwasassumed to equal (.3r + .7
max (rj, (I—m)r2)), the risk free after tax return to savings. Thirty per cent of (marginal or
average) savings are assumed here to be untaxed.
51. The major purpose of this paper is to investigate, for integration of corporate and personalF-8
taxes, the sensitivity of estimates to different model specifications. Rather than look at several
types of integration (including partial plans or dividend relief) under one model specification,
we find it more useful to look at one type of integration under several model specifications.
For more discussion of partial integration plans, see McLure (1979) or Fullerton, King, Sho-
yen, and Whalley (1981).
52. These marginal tax rates differ if individuals who choose to form their own businesses
differ systematically from those who invest in financial securities.
53. This formula for m follows from the derivation of the Gordon-Bradford (1980) model on
the assumption that individuals are equally risk averse at the margin.
54. An equivalent procedure, actually used in our calculations, uses equation (4) for p, sets
r to .1948, and sets ab to l.-.1948 =.8052.Together, these changes imply that -y=O and that
leverage costs go to zero.
55. For income effects of taxation in this model, we use features from the FSW model. In
the benchmark equilibrium, only 96% of dividends are taxable, to account for the $100 divi-
dend exclusion in 1973. Retained earnings were assumed to generate equivalent accrued capital
gains, but these are taxed on a deferred basis at preferential rates. Accounting for taxation of
purely nominal capital gains, however, FSW use 73% as the proportion of retained earnings
subject to full personal rates. Integration changes both of these latter proportions to one. Also
in the benchmark, individuals reduce their personal tax base by 30% of savings, the amount
contributed to pensions, Keogh, and IRA accounts. This remained unchanged under integra-
tion.
56. When personal income tax rates are raised, the interpersonal allocation of savings is
further distorted, as are local public goods decisions.
57. Capital tends to leave general government in part because as personal income tax rates
rise, its relative prices for labor and commodities (which are proportional to (1—n)) fall moreF-9
than does the cost of capital.
Appendix Footnotes
58. Both Tables 5.8 and 6.16 of the SCBprovidedata on the inventory valuation adjustment,
but are taken from different sources. Table 5.8 estimates are used in the product side of the
GNP accounts, while Table 6.16 estimates are used for the income side. See the Survey of
CurrentBusiness for further detail on the concepts.
59. Note that .l62/.205 equals .789, while .123/.205 equals .600.R- 1
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Thisappendix describes the procedures for obtaining four data series: unemploy-
ment insurance tax rates, investment tax credit rates, economic depreciation rates,and tax
depreciation rates.
I. Unemployment Insurance Tax Rates
In the above simulations, we required the net (of benefit) unemployment insurance
tax rates for 1973, for eighteen private industries. These industries arefor the most part aggre-
gations of two to three SIC two-digit industries in manufacturing,and broader classifications
(e.g., wholesale and retail trade) outside of manufacturing. Becker's (1972)data for unemploy-
ment insurance benefit and tax rates, on the other hand, came from sixteen state employment
security agencies for various combinations of years and industries (see histables A.5 to A.9).
He has provided information for 1961, 1967, and the 1957-67 average. Industrydetail included
broad classifications such as "manufacturing" and "wholesale and retail trade", selected two-digit
industries, and selected three-digit industries. Typically, data for a particular industry were
available for only a few states, and not all time periods.
In view of the discrepancies between required and available data, we computed the
net tax rate for each industry from the 1957-67 sample and the 1967 sample.The unweighted
average from the two samples was taken as the estimatefor the industry. If the FSW industry
consisted of several two-digit industries, this procedure was applied to each two-digit industry,
and the average of these tax rates was used as the FSW industry tax rate. There were two
exceptions to this general procedure caused by lack of industry information.For the two min-
ing industries, petroleum and natural gas and other mining, we usedthe same estimate, the oneA-2
available for their total. For petroleum refining, we averaged estimates for two other nondur-
able industries, chemicals and rubber and paper and printing.
II. Effective Investment Tax Credit Rates
To compute the investment tax credit rates, we divided the dollar amount of the
credit taken in each industry by the level of investment in that industry. Because we were cal-
culating effective rates, investment included purchases of structures and the change in inven-
tories, even though these types of investment are not eligible for the ITC. We were forced to
aggregate corporate and non-corporate data because there was no separate information about
investment in these two sectors. This procedure is appropriate in that the samestatutory rates
apply to both sectors, but may be inaccurate if the type of investment differs between the cor-
porate and non-corporate sectors of an industry.
Tables on the investment tax credit by industry appear in the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice Statistics of Income, Corporation Income Tax Returns, but the ITC for sole proprietors and
partners does not appear in the Statistics of Income publications for these returns. Unpublished
data on the 1973 non-corporate ITC were made available by the Treasury Department, andwe
used the assumption of a constant ratio of non-corporate to corporate ITC in each industry to
estimate the non-corporate ITC for 1974. These data were then aggregated to our industry
definitions for each of the two years.
Our principle source for data on fixed investment by industry was the Commerce
Department's survey of expenditures for new plant and equipment by U.S. business, as
reported in the Survey of Current Business (SCB). Supplementary unpublished data were pro-
vided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the Commerce Department. The cover-
age of this survey was satisfactory for our manufacturing industries and for transportation, corn-
munications, and utilities. Information on other industries was inadequate for various reasons:
agricultural business and housing are excluded entirely from the survey, some service industries
are omitted, and investment in mining is underreported because capital expenditures for unsuc-
cessful mineral explorations are expensed rather than being included as an investment oncorn-A-3
pany books. As a result, we used several different procedures for obtaining investment in these
remaining industries. For real estate, we used the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) figures for residential investment. This omits the relatively small nonresidential invest-
ment by this industry (brokers' offices), but we were not able to find information on this com-
ponent. For agriculture, we used NIPA data on investment in agricultural machinery and non-
residential farm structures. Agricultural machinery is only part of the equipment purchased by
farmers, and the rest (tractors, trucks, automobiles, etc.) is not broken down between agricul-
tural and nonagricultural uses on an annual basis. We scaled up our estimate of equipment
spending to total agricultural equipment in both years using information from the 1972 capital
flow table (CFT) of BEA. For the remaining industries, we used the CFT data for 1972, multi-
plied by growth rates for the closest corresponding category from the 1973 and 1974 investment
surveys.
Inventory investment estimates for agriculture and trade came directly from the Sur-
vey of Current Business (Tables 1.1 and 5.8, respectively). For other industries, we added
together the book value change in inventories and the inventory valuation adjustment (IVA).
BEA provided unpublished data for the IVA (consistent with Table 6.16 of the SCB) for each
of our industries for 1973. The 1974 IVA's were estimated using growth rates in the IVA for
broad industry classifications (such as "durable manufacturing') from Table 5.8 of the SCB.58
The change in the book value of inventories came from the Census Bureau's monthly report on
Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories, and Orders, available from Data Resources, Inc.
(DRI). In some cases, it was necessary to impute data for two-digit manufacturing industries
and non-manufacturing industries. This was done using information on the size of the industry
as measured by investment in the 1972 CFT, as well as information on inventory change in
Table 5.8 of the SCB.
III. Economic Depreciation Rates
As described in Section II.C.5 above, economic depreciation rates were found for
each industry by calculating the rate that was most consistent with the dollar value of economicA-4
depreciation for the period 1972 to 1974 and the stream of investment through 1974.
For economic depreciation in twelve two-digit and three-digit manufacturing indus-
tries, we used the "variant C" estimates of Coen (1980), which are provided through 1974. For
agriculture and real estate we used the Commerce Department's capital consumption allowances
with capital consumption adjustment from the SCB,Tables1.13, 6.15, and 6.24. Estimates of
economic depreciation rates were not available for more than these fourteen industries, buta
procedure to extend depreciation rates to other industries is described below.
The data for nominal fixed investment described in the previous section on invest-
ment tax credit rates were extended back to 1947, and the price deflator for fixed investment
from the National Income Accounts was used to convert those figures to constant dollars for
the appropriate year (i1972, 1973, 1974). This was not possible for all industries, however.
The investment survey data described in the previous section were available from DRI for six-
teen two-digit industries since 1947 (including the twelve manufacturing industries). For the
real estate industry, we were able to use the NIPA data discussed in the previous section. For
agriculture, we had investment in agricultural machinery since 1947, but information on non-
farm structures was available only back to 1958. We extended the latter to 1947 byassuming
that it was .77 of the former, a figure based on the ratios for 1958, 1959, and 1960.
We still had to account for the (small) amount of the capital stock in 1972 to 1974
that was the result of investment prior to 1947. Using NIPA data, we estimated that realnon-
residential fixed investment increased at a 2.7% rate between 1929 and 1947, and real residen-
tial investment at a 2.1% rate, and applied these aggregate growth rates as described in the text.
Using the above information, we computed economic depreciation rates for fourteen
industries. Some of the eighteen FSW industries correspond exactly to these industries. Some
are aggregates of these available industries, and we computed economic depreciation rates for
these aggregates.
For industries for which we had no depreciation data, we inferred informationon
the durability of their capital stock from data on their relative purchases of structures andA-5
equipment, as reported in the 1972 BEA CFT, which was available for all of our disaggregated
industries. We used our estimated depreciation rates for available two-digit and three-digit
industries, agriculture, and real estate in a regression on the ratios of equipment to total plant
and equipment (and the square of that ratio). This regression gave us a predictive equation for
depreciation rates of other two-digit industries based on their ratios of equipment to total plant
and equipment. If one of the model's industries was entirely unrepresented in the available
depreciation rate estimates, we used the predicted rate based on its 1972 CFT data. If part of
an industry was represented in the available depreciation rate estimates, we used that estimate
in combination with a prediction for the other part, weighting by the value of the capital stock
in 1972 in each section of the industry.
Since a published estimate of the capital stock was not available for each two-digit
industry, we estimated each capital stock ourselves. In particular, if d is our estimate for the
economic depreciation rate in a particular industry, ifis the estimated growth rate in real
investment in that industry during the period 1947 to 1972, and if 1Risthe real gross fixed
investment in the industry in 1972, then we approximated the capital stock in the industry in
1972 by:
K = 1R ee -didt
Where an industry's growth rate of investment was unavailable, we used a growth rate based on
more aggregated data (e.g. manufacturing).
IV. Tax Depreciation Rates
The methodology for computing tax depreciation rates was similar to the methodol-
ogy for economic depreciation: we searched for the rate in each industry that was consistent
with observed depreciation allowances and investment streams. The data for depreciation
allowances came from the IRS Statistics of Income for both corporate and non-corporate enter-
prises, by industry. For real estate and agriculture, we used SCB tables 6.15 and 6.24. The
rates for industries for which investment data were missing were derived in a manner similar toA-6
the economic depreciation rates, by regressions using the ratio of equipment to total invest-
men t.
The main difference in the methodology from that for economic depreciation rates
was that we accounted for major changes in tax laws regarding depreciation allowances. In par-
ticular. prior to 1954, firms could use straight line depreciation based on Bulletin F lifetimes.
In 1954, double declining balance or sum of the years' digits methods of tax depreciation were
introduced, and in 1971, tax lifetimes were reduced by twenty percent through the Asset
Depreciation Range (ADR) system. In each of these periods, therefore, the tax depreciation
rate was different. We proceeded by calculating how the effective geometric depreciation rates
would differ among these periods for a representative asset with a 14 year tax lifetime prior to
ADR. Suppose investment in this asset had been growing continuously at the nominal rate
#.07 (calculated by regressing the log of the NIPA total fixed nonresidential investment from
1947 to 1976 on time). Then under the double declining balance formula, tax depreciation
deductions in year i would be:
T/2 T
TD =f I, e' di+ f --I,e_2e_Mtdi
0T T/2T
where I is nominal investment in year i. The equivalent geometric depreciation rate would be
that rate d' which would have implied the same size of tax deductions. With geometric depreci-
ation, tax deductions would have been:
TD d'J, ed'tetdi
When we equate these two formulas and use T =14and L= .07,the only remaining unknown
is d'. We therefore conclude that the effective depreciation rate for this representative asset
would have been .162 for the period 1954-1970. After 1971, when T was reduced by 20%, the
effective rate implied by the above formulas increased to .205.
In contrast, with straight line depreciation, tax deductions would have been:
T
TD1 = Ie'dt '° TA-7
Therefore, the effective geometric depreciation rate for this representative asset prior to 1954
would have been .123.
Based on these results, we assumed in our calculations that if the effective geometric
depreciation rate d'wasavailable on investments made since 1971, then the rate .789 d'was
available during the period 1954-70,andthe rate .600 d'duringthe period prior to l954. We
recognize that our procedure omits the effects of many other revisions during the period both
in Treasury Department rulings and in the degree to which firms took advantage of the avail-
able rulings. A more thorough procedure, for example, might use information from Vasquez
(1974) on the proportion of investment that was depreciated by the faster methods allowed fol-
lowing the 1954 and 1971 changes in the law. Our procedure should effectively capture the
basic differences in the tax treatment of depreciation among the various industries, which is
what we needed.